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Abstract
Misinformation can have significant societal consequences. For example, misinformation about
climate change has confused the public and stalled support for mitigation policies. When people lack
the expertise and skill to evaluate the science behind a claim, they typically rely on heuristics such as
substituting judgment about something complex (i.e. climate science) with judgment about
something simple (i.e. the character of people who speak about climate science) and are therefore
vulnerable to misleading information. Inoculation theory offers one approach to effectively neutralize
the influence of misinformation. Typically, inoculations convey resistance by providing people with
information that counters misinformation. In contrast, we propose inoculating against
misinformation by explaining the fallacious reasoning within misleading denialist claims. We offer a
strategy based on critical thinking methods to analyse and detect poor reasoning within denialist
claims. This strategy includes detailing argument structure, determining the truth of the premises,
and checking for validity, hidden premises, or ambiguous language. Focusing on argument structure
also facilitates the identification of reasoning fallacies by locating them in the reasoning process.
Because this reason-based form of inoculation is based on general critical thinking methods, it offers
the distinct advantage of being accessible to those who lack expertise in climate science. We applied
this approach to 42 common denialist claims and find that they all demonstrate fallacious reasoning
and fail to refute the scientific consensus regarding anthropogenic global warming. This
comprehensive deconstruction and refutation of the most common denialist claims about climate
change is designed to act as a resource for communicators and educators who teach climate science
and/or critical thinking.
1. Introduction
Misinformation, defined as information initially pre-
sented as true that is later found to be false
(Lewandowsky et al 2012), is a societal issue of growing
concern. The World Economic Forum listed online
misinformation as one of the top ten global trends
threatening the world (WEF 2014). Oxford Dictionary
named ‘post-truth’ the 2016 word of the year (Flood
2016) while Collins Dictionary named ‘fake news’ the
2017 word of the year (Flood 2017) in recognition of
the prevalence and impact of misinformation.
The issue of climate change has been particularly
impacted by misinformation. There is an overwhelm-
ing scientific consensus that humans are causing global
warming (Cook et al 2016), with a number of stud-
ies converging on 97% agreement among publishing
climate scientists or relevant climate papers (Doran
and Zimmerman 2009, Anderegg et al 2010, Cook
et al 2013, Carlton et al 2015). However, there is
little awareness of the scientific consensus among
the general public with only 12% of Americans
aware that the consensus is above 90% (Leiserowitz
et al 2017).
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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A major contributor to public misperceptions
about climate change is a persistent, decades-long mis-
information campaign (McCright and Dunlap 2010).
Content analysis of conservative think-tank articles
found that arguments casting doubt on climate science
are increasing relative to policy arguments (Boussalis
andCoan2016).Climatemisinformation impacts pub-
lic perceptions about climate change in various ways.
It decreases acceptance of climate change and lowers
confidence about people’s understanding (Ranney and
Clark 2016). Climate misinformation also dispropor-
tionately influences conservatives (Cook et al 2017,
van der Linden et al 2017), contributing to grow-
ing polarization over recent decades (McCright and
Dunlap 2011). Misinformation cancels out the pos-
itive effect of accurate information (McCright et al
2016, van der Linden et al 2017), implying that
accurate science communication is a necessary but
insufficient condition to increasing science literacy
levels.
Interventions are therefore required to help the
public develop resistance to persuasion from mis-
informing sources. Inoculation theory provides a
framework for helping people develop immunity to
persuasive misinformation (McGuire and Papageorgis
1961). This approach applies the concept of vaccina-
tion to knowledge—it is possible to build resistance
to misinformation by exposing people to a weak
form of the misinformation. An inoculating text con-
sists of a forewarning of an upcoming persuasion
attempt as well as counter-arguments that refute the
information.
Inoculation theory however, requires interven-
tion prior to misinformation being received (Bolsen
and Druckman 2015). In addition, inoculation
theory usually involves the presentation of com-
peting factual claims which if presented after
misinformation has solidified subject belief, can
result in the backfire effect (Nyhan and Reifler
2010).
We examine a different approach to pre-emptively
refuting climate denial misinformation using critical
thinking techniques—one that focuses on under-
standing the logical structure of denialist arguments
rather than the truth claims they consist of. Reason-
based inoculation is consistent with Compton (2005),
who argued that Aristotelian rationality offers a
useful framework for inoculating refutations. This
approach has been tested experimentally, with an inoc-
ulation explaining a misleading technique without
including competing factual information demonstrat-
ing success in neutralizing the influence of the
misinformation (Cook et al 2017). This paper intro-
duces key critical thinking concepts and outlines a
straightforwardprocess for identifying reasoning errors
that allows for people who lack expertise in cli-
mate science to confidently reject certain denialist
arguments.
2. Understanding arguments
It is important to distinguish between the colloquial
use of the term argument to indicate disagreement,
often heated, and its formal use here. By argument, we
mean a connected series of statements used to establish
a definite proposition (Chapman and Python 1989).
It is a logical structure that uses the truth of one or
more claims (called premises) to establish the truth
of some other claim (called the conclusion). In short,
arguments give us reasons to believe a claim is true, in
a way not linked to the identity, social position, tenor,
or rhetorical ability of the person making the claim.
Arguments consist of truth-bearing statements or
claims called propositions. A proposition is any mean-
ingful utterance that can be true or false, like ‘over 90%
of climate scientists believe in anthropogenic climate
change’ (true), ‘New York City is the capital of New
York state’ (false), or ‘it will rain tomorrow’ (unknow-
able today). We can contrast propositional statements
with non-propositional ones that can not be true or
false like ‘What is the time?’ (interrogative), ‘Look out!’
(imperative), ‘Donuts—yum!’ (exclamative). Premises
and conclusions must be able to be expressed as propo-
sitions. Arguments can answer questions but they can
not be constructed with them.
Propositions can be combined in ways such that
their truth content gives us information about the truth
content of other propositions. If some set of propo-
sitions being true (the premises) makes some other
proposition (the conclusion) more likely to be true,
then we can say that the truth of the premises supports
the truth of the conclusion. The degree of this support
provides us with an important criterion for the judging
the quality of an argument.
If the truth of an argument’s premises have no
bearing on the truth of its conclusion, we say that the
argument is a non sequitur4. For example:
P: I once saw a white swan.
C: My pet is a bird.
If the premises give the conclusion only limited
support—if the premises being true makes our belief
about the truth of the conclusion only somewhat more
likely—we describe the argument as inductively weak.
P: I once saw a white swan.
C: All swans are white.
If the premises being true makes our belief about
the conclusion’s truth much more likely, we describe
the argument as inductively strong.
P1: I have seen a very large number of swans and
they have all been white.
P2: The swans I have seen varied in age, sex, and
location.
C: All swans are white.
4 Whilst the term non sequitur is sometimes used as a synonym for
any invalid inference, here we use it in its more common sense as a
failure of relevance.
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Figure 1. Flowchart for evaluating contrarian claims. Circles indicate possible fallacies to be detected at each stage. See supplementary
table S1 for definition of each fallacy.
Sometimes however, the premises of an argument
together logically entail the truth of the conclusion.
This notion of entailment means that it is impossible
for the conclusion to be false whilst all the premises
are true. When the truth of the premises guarantees
or entails the truth of the conclusion, we describe the
argument as deductively valid.
P1: All swans are white.
P2: My pet is not white.
C: My pet is not a swan.
As anyone who has travelled to Australia may have
seen however, not all swans are white. A good argu-
ment relies on more than just logical structure—its
premises must also be true. These examples highlight
two important measures for evaluating the quality of
an argument—how strongly the premises support the
conclusion (the logical structure) and whether or not
the premises are in fact true.
3. Definitive and provisional claims
Whether an argument is deductive or inductive
depends on what type of concluding proposition the
argument is supposed to establish. Propositions can
be made true in different ways. Some are necessarily
true: ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ or ‘Deciduous
trees shed their leaves’. Necessarily true propositions
are made true by virtue of their meaning.
Contingently true propositions by contrast are true
but need not have been—‘Berlin is the capital of
Germany’ or ‘The Sydney Swans won the 2012 AFL
grand final’. Given the meaning of the terms, it could
never have been the case that necessarily true state-
ments were false but contingently true propositions
could have been.
Of these contingently true propositions, we might
further distinguish between those that are demonstra-
bly true and those that are provisionally true. ‘Donald
Trump is the 45th President of the United States’ is
demonstrably true becausewe have observable and ver-
ifiable evidence for it. ‘Liberal democracies do not go to
war with one another’ by contrast is provisionally true
since there have been no counter-examples to it thus
far.
Conclusions with definitive claims require deduc-
tive inferences to support them. When the conclusion
of our argument is intended to be definitive, that it
is in fact the case, then no new claim should be able
to undermine this. The argument must be indefeasi-
ble and the conclusion becomes necessarily true if the
premises are all true.
Provisionally true claims do not require such sup-
port. Because they are always open to refutation, the
arguments that support them need only be defeasible.
Inductive inference is therefore indicative of provision-
ally true claims.
4. Evaluating denialist claims as arguments
Much of the effort to date in refuting denialist argu-
ments has focused on the truth content of particular
claims—showing for example that global temperatures
are rising (Lewandowsky et al 2016) or that there is
overwhelming expert consensus that human activity is
responsible for much of this change (Cook et al 2013).
Whilst identifying factual errors is important, research
into the ability of misinformation to neutralize factual
information indicates that there are limitations to this
approach (McCright et al 2016). A more comprehen-
sive approach should include identification of flaws in
misinforming arguments and explain how the reasons
offered do not adequately support their conclusions
(Cook et al 2017, van der Linden et al 2017).
Our contention is that a basic understanding of
argumentation is sufficient to refute a large number of
climate denialist claims. Applying the introduction to
argument structure from section 2, we now outline a
process for evaluating climate denialist arguments and
apply it to common denialist claims.
Figure 1 outlines a flowchart for evaluating an
argument’s cogency. The following sections detail each
step in the analysis process. Within the chart, we have
also identified locations where certain fallacies of rea-
soning are typically made. This is to progress work
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already done on fallacies found in the denial of cli-
mate science (Cook et al 2015). Supplementary table
S1 available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/13/024018/mmedia
includes definitions of the fallacies found in the most
common contrarian claims about climate change.
4.1. Identification of claim
Webegin by identifying a denialist claim for evaluation
(Step 1). For example, a common contrarian claim is
‘Earth’s climatehaschangednaturallybefore, socurrent
climate change is natural.’ In constructing and evaluat-
ing an argument, it is critical to have clarity about the
claim being made. It is also important that the claim
is not misrepresented or changed to alter its mean-
ing. As such, we recommend seeking claims made by
contrarians and dealing with these as presented.
4.2. Construction of argument
Weconstruct the argument supporting a claimby iden-
tifying the set of propositions constituting the premises
and conclusion (Step 2). In the case of the claim above
the structure would be:
P1: The climate has changed in the past through
natural processes
P2: The climate is currently changing
C: The climate is currently changing through nat-
ural processes
Having established the argument structure, we next
determine the inferential intent of the argument as
either deductive or inductive (Step 3).
4.3. Determine inferential intent
How strongly the conclusion of an argument is formu-
lateddetermines the typeof inferential support required
from the premises. Definitive conclusions require the
support of deductively valid arguments whilst pro-
visional conclusions require only inductive support.
Within science, we find both deductive and induc-
tive arguments. Deductive inferences are common and
form the basis of the hypothetico-deductive method:
P1: If my theory is correct, then I will observe this
phenomenon.
P2: I did not observe this phenomenon.
C: My theory is not correct.
Yet it is inductive reasoning that underpins the bulk
of our empirically derived knowledge:
P1: There is a strong correlation between smok-
ing and cancer in many studies that controlled for
numerous possible confounders.
P2: There is a plausible explanatory framework for
why smoking would cause cancer.
C: Smoking very likely causes cancer.
Whilst the conclusions of inductive inferences
are often stated definitively in everyday language e.g.
‘smoking causes cancer’, they are not intended to be
definitive. The majority of scientific claims are open
to adjustment, correction and even refutation. The
ability to state the conditions under which a theory
can be falsified, and hence refuted, is an important
determiner for discriminating science from pseudo-
science (Popper 1957).
Climate denialist claims however, are typically
definitive, taking a form such as ‘human activity is
not the cause of current climate change’ rather than
‘human activitymight not be the primary cause of cur-
rent climate change’. Similar definitive denialist claims
are common (Elsasser and Dunlap 2013)
• ‘Climate change is not happening.’
• ‘There is no empirical evidence that humans are
causing global warming.’
• ‘There is no scientific consensus that human-caused
climate change is occurring.’
If we are to accept these denialist claims, then like
any definitive conclusion, they must be supported by a
deductively valid argument.
Of course, not all denialist claims are stated defini-
tively, such as arguments that exaggerate the role
of scientific uncertainty (Freudenburg and Muselli
2013, McCright and Dunlap 2000). As such they
only require inductive support. In cases where non-
definitive denialist claims conflict with non-definitive
claims of climate science, then we need some other
method to reconcile competing inductive arguments.
How we should reconcile competing inductive infer-
ences is outside the scope of this paper.
If the denialist intent is to support a definitive claim
through a deductive argument, then the next step in the
process is to check for validity. If the intent is to produce
a claim which is not definitive because it relies on an
inductive argument, then the attempted refutation of
anthropogenic global warming (AGW) has already
failed.
4.4. Check for validity
If the argument in question is deductive in intent, it
is then checked for validity (Step 4). An argument in
support of definitive claims must be deductively valid,
for without this degree of logical entailment the truth
of the premises gives us insufficient reason to accept
the truth of the conclusion.
The claim that ‘Human activity is not causing cli-
mate change’ is often supported with the idealised
argument below.
P1: A previous change in climate was not the result
of human activity.
P2: The climate is currently changing.
C: The current change in climate is not the result
of human activity.
There is a variety of formal methods available
to prove that an argument is valid, such as truth
tables, trees, or tableau.Unfortunately, formalmethods
require a degree of training in formal logic to use and
therefore it is usually much simpler to demonstrate an
argument is invalid by use of a parallel argument.
Parallel arguments use the same logical structure as
the target argument but instantiate it in such a way that
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the conclusion is obviously false. In a valid argument
it is impossible for the conclusion to be false whilst
all the premises are true. Parallel arguments identify a
clear counter example and show that an argument is
not valid. Parallel arguments have strong pedagogical
value because they use concrete examples, which are
closer to our own experience than abstract reasoning
(Juthe 2009). For example:
P1: A previous swan death was not the result of
human activity.
P2: This swan is dying.
C: This swan dying is not the result of human
activity.
It is clear that the conclusions do not necessarily
follow from the premises and the arguments are there-
fore invalid. Just because something can be a cause,
does not make it a cause in any particular instance.
The conclusion is not justified by the reasons given, so
we must either reject the conclusion or revise it so the
argument is valid as follows:
P1: A previous change in climate was not the result
of human activity.
P2: The climate is currently changing.
C: The current change in climate may not be the
result of human activity.
(Note that now the conclusion has been changed
to make the argument valid, it is no longer definitive
and the attempt at refuting AGW fails. This will be
explained further in section 4.5).
4.4.1. Identify hidden premises
If the argument is determined to be invalid, we next
attempt to identify any hidden premises that might be
added to the argument to make it logically valid (Step
4a). Arguments often rely onunstated assumptions and
implied conclusions to be valid. These hidden premises
mustbemadeexplicit for theargument tobecomevalid.
Another common denialist argument against human-
caused global warming can be articulated as follows:
P1: There is no empirical evidence that humans are
causing global warming.
[P2 (Hidden): If there is no empiric evidence for
something, then it is not happening.]
C: Humans are not causing global warming.
By making clear the hidden premise, we can made
this argument valid. We can do the same with the first
argument from section 4.4. Rather than reject the con-
clusion because it was not adequately supported by the
premise or change the conclusion’s modality from nec-
essarily not the cause to possibly not the cause, we can
keep the stronger conclusion and add a new premise to
make the argument valid.
P1: A previous change in climate was not the result
of human activity.
P2: The climate is currently changing.
P3: (Hidden) If something was not the cause in the
past, it will not be the cause in the future.
C: The current change in climate is not the result
of human activity.
Now both arguments are valid and the conclusions
would be true, if all of the premises were in fact true.
Whether the an argument should convince us is depen-
dent on both the strength of the logical structure and
the premises actually being true.
4.5. Check for ambiguity
If an argument is logically valid (or we added hid-
den premises to create validity), we next check
for ambiguity. A common form of ambiguity is
equivocation—when the same word or phrase is used
with two different meanings (Step 5). Consider now
the following trope:
P1: Nothing is better than eternal happiness (true).
P2: A ham sandwich is better than nothing (true).
C: A ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness
(entailed from 1 and 2).
Obviously, the conclusion is false even though the
argument is valid and the premises (when stated in
isolation) are (arguably) true. The argument however,
relies on ambiguous language, or equivocation, regard-
ing the term ‘nothing’. In premise 1, we mean no
thing is better than eternal happiness; in premise 2 we
mean having a ham sandwich is better than not having
one. Once we remove the equivocation, the argument
becomes invalid (indeed a non sequitur) and we can
reject the conclusion.
Some climate denialist arguments rely on similar
equivocation. Consider the following variation of the
‘past climate change’ contrarian claim:
P1: Natural process and human activity can both
cause climate change.
P2: Climate change is currently occurring.
C: Human activity is not necessary to explain cur-
rent climate change.
The syntax conveys the impression that the argu-
ment is valid, but it is not. The term ‘climate change’
referred to in Premise 1 and Premise 3 do not have
the same meaning, since the rate of change is different
in each. If equivocation exists, we resolve it by either
clarifying the argument’s language or adding premises
to resolve any ambiguity (Step 5a). In this example,
Premise 3 is amended to clarify the rate of current cli-
mate change.OncePremise3 is amended, the argument
becomes invalid:
P1: Natural processes have caused climate change
in the past.
P2: Human activity can cause climate change.
P3:The climate is currently changingat amuchmore
rapid rate than can be explained by natural processes.
C: Human activity is not necessary to explain cur-
rent climate change.
We can attempt to restore validity by accepting the
premises and seeing what conclusion must follow from
them (Step 5b):
P1: Natural processes have caused climate change
in the past.
P2: Human activity can cause climate change.
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P3:The climate is currently changingat amuchmore
rapid rate than can be explained by natural processes.
C: Human activity is necessary to explain current
climate change.
If the resolution resulting from the amendment
of any premises renders the argument invalid, then
the contrarian claim is considered to have failed in
refutingAGW. If the argument remains valid after reso-
lution, thenwe see whether the conclusion has changed
as part of that validation process. If the conclusion
is off-point relative to the original conclusion, then
the contrarian claim has failed. In this example, the
conclusion has changed such that natural causation
of climate change has been ruled out, coming to
the opposite conclusion to the original version of
the argument. Importantly, in rewriting the premises
to avoid equivocation, the conclusion has necessar-
ily changed—it is not something that was arrived at
arbitrarily.
4.6. Check premises for truth or plausibility
If the conclusion stays on-point or the argument has
not been ruled out in earlier steps (i.e. it is deductive,
valid, andwithno equivocation), then thefinal step is to
determine the truth of the premises (Step 6). A major
advantage of the approach we are proposing in this
paper is that evaluating climate denialist claims as argu-
ments allows a general reader to judge the veracity of
many claims about science without the need for exper-
tise in climate science (and allow non-expert recipients
of a refutation to comprehend why a claim is false). Yet
as we have just outlined, good arguments require more
than the conclusion being true if the premises were
all true, they also require the premises to be true. So
then how do we evaluate the truth of the premises
without expertise in climate science?
The simple answer is that we often do not need to.
Denialist arguments, once made valid by articulating
any required suppressed premises, will tend to rely on
demonstrably false or implausible general claims. Take
for example, the assumed premise in the last argu-
ment ‘If something was the cause in the past, it will be
the cause in the future’. This claim is highly implau-
sible for any effect that has multiple possible causal
mechanisms. So too, the claim ‘If there is no empiric
evidence for something, then it is not happening’
which mistakes an absence of evidence for evidence of
absence.
5. Discussion
Psychological research indicates that explaining the
techniques employed to distort scientific information
is an important component of neutralising misinfor-
mation. This paper lays out a template for systematic
deconstruction and assessment of denialist claims, in
order to identify false premises and fallacious rea-
soning. We explicitly restrict ourselves to deductive
claims that purport to refute mainstream climate
science. However, inductive arguments have also
employed inorder to cast doubt on the reality of climate
change, usually by misrepresenting or exaggerating
the nature of scientific uncertainty (Freudenburg and
Muselli 2013,McCright andDunlap 2000).Assessment
of inductive denialist claims from a critical thinking
perspective is an area of future research.
Our reason-based approach to refuting climate
science misinformation could be used as a specific
application of current inoculation theory. Typically,
inoculation interventions are information-based, con-
taining facts that counter the misleading information.
For example, van der Linden et al (2017) countered
the Global Warming Petition Project by communi-
cating the 97% scientific consensus on human-caused
global warming, as well as explaining specific mislead-
ing elements of the Petition Project. In contrast, Cook
et al (2017) used a reason-based inoculation against the
Global Warming Petition Project that refrained from
mentioning the 97% consensus or the Petition Project.
Instead, the explanation of the general technique of
fake experts was successful in inoculating partici-
pants against the negative influence of the Petition
Project. Further research into this approach is recom-
mended, directly comparing its efficacy to information-
based inoculations, measuring how susceptible reason-
based interventions are subject to decay effects, and
exploring whether reason-based inoculations can con-
vey resistance against multiple arguments.
Supplementary table S2 includes analysis of 42
common climate myths that feature deductive argu-
ments, taken from the Massive Open Online Course
(MOOC), Denial101x: Making Sense of Climate Sci-
enceDenial (Cook et al2015) andemploying the critical
thinking approach explained in the MOOCMeta101x:
Philosophy and Critical Thinking (Brown and Ellerton
2015). Our analysis found that all of the 42 denialist
claims failed to falsify anthropogenic global warming.
However, these claims are effective inmisinforming the
public and decreasing climate literacy. Consequently,
refuting and neutralizing the influence of this misin-
formation is necessary.
Social media presents one potent option for
practically deploying resources of this type to neu-
tralize misinformation, using an approach described
as ‘technocognition’: an approach that incorporates
principles from behavioural economics, cognitive
psychology, and philosophy in the design of infor-
mation architectures (Lewandowsky et al 2017).
Misconception-based learning, applied in the class-
room, is another powerful and practical model for
deploying inoculation content (McCuin et al 2014).
While there have been efforts to apply this approach
to climate education (Bedford 2010, Cook et al 2014),
and development of resources (Bedford and Cook
2016), there is in general a dearth of misconception-
based learning resources for educators (Tippett 2010).
Consequently, this research is designed to act as a
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building block for developing educationalmaterial that
teaches critical thinking through the examination of
misinformation and evaluation of arguments.
This work may also serve as a template for analy-
sis of misinformation on other topics besides climate
change. Misinformation about vaccination, evolution,
and other scientific topics have negative impacts on
science literacy and can lead to severe societal conse-
quences. Consequently, application of our process for
evaluating misleading claims may be useful in devel-
oping resources for scientists, communicators, and
educators seeking to reduce the influence of misin-
formation across a variety of issues.
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